The specter of chemical weapons continues to loom large, casting a dark shadow on global security and underscoring a grave misuse of chemical sciences. These insidious devices, designed to inflict death, injury, temporary incapacitation, or sensory irritation through toxic chemicals, represent a persistent threat to humanity. While infamous chemical warfare agents (CWAs) like sarin and mustard gas are engineered for lethality, even seemingly benign industrial chemicals such as chlorine and phosgene harbor the potential for weaponization.
Since 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has stood as a bulwark against the proliferation of these horrific weapons, prohibiting their production and stockpiling. Yet, documented instances of their use in ongoing conflicts, perpetrated by both state and non-state actors, have reignited global anxieties. Adding to these concerns is the growing convergence of chemistry and biology, a cross-disciplinary frontier yielding profound insights into the mechanisms of chemical toxicity. This convergence, while holding immense promise, also presents the ominous prospect of producing toxic chemicals through clandestine and difficult-to-monitor methods. Consequently, international efforts are increasingly focused on preempting the resurgence of chemical weapons, irrespective of their origin – be it traditional chemical synthesis or bio-mediated production.
The American Chemical Society (ACS) is a staunch advocate for the initiatives undertaken by international bodies, such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations Security Council, to rigorously investigate and ensure accountability for those responsible for deploying chemicals as weapons. Furthermore, ACS actively promotes research aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of chemical monitoring and detection technologies.
Bolstering Chemical Safety and Security Measures
ACS wholeheartedly supports the endeavors of the United States, the chemical industry, and the broader international community to fortify the safety and security of chemical manufacturing processes. In this context, ACS champions the informed and collaborative engagement of chemical professionals with policymakers and local communities to mitigate the potential for chemical misuse. The critical evaluation of alternative materials, and exploring alternative applications for existing materials, has gained paramount importance. This is driven by heightened scrutiny of the comprehensive impact of chemicals throughout their lifecycle – from manufacturing to utilization and disposal – coupled with increasingly stringent regulations governing their effects on workers and the environment.
Recognizing the pivotal role of governments in fostering global dialogue to minimize and prevent chemical threats, ACS lends its support to programs aligned with this mission. These include the US State Department’s Chemical Security Program and the Export Control and Related Border Security Program, alongside related initiatives funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. Notably, ACS underscores the importance of initiatives designed to elevate standards for responsible conduct and proactively prevent the misuse of pharmaceutical compounds as weapons, as detailed further below.
Establishing Benchmarks for Responsible Conduct: The Role of Responsible Care®
Chemical practitioners worldwide have been instrumental in the grassroots development and adoption of ethical standards, exemplified by the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE), the Hague Ethical Guidelines, and The Chemical Professional’s Code of Conduct. These frameworks serve as invaluable guides for chemical professionals navigating ethical dilemmas encountered in their professional activities, promoting sound decision-making.
Moreover, voluntary industry initiatives, most prominently the American Chemical Society Responsible Care Program and its Guiding Principles, represent a powerful and proactive approach to preventing the weaponization of chemicals. The unwavering commitment demonstrated by organizations such as the American Chemistry Council and the International Council of Chemical Associations, through Responsible Care® and associated programs, to continuously strengthen the environmental, health, safety, and security performance of the chemical industry, underpins chemistry’s vital contribution to improving the human condition.
In furtherance of these critical efforts, ACS strongly urges governments to prioritize the following key actions:
- Enhance the Safety and Security of Chemical Inventories: Strengthen safeguards against threats posed by terrorists and criminals by expanding voluntary measures, such as “Know Your Customer” codes of practice, across the entire spectrum of chemical manufacturing and user industries. This is a core tenet supported by the American Chemical Society Responsible Care Program.
- Optimize Regulatory Frameworks for Export Control: Refine export control regulations to ensure they effectively prevent irresponsible chemical use by “downstream” purchasers, while simultaneously minimizing unintended disruptions to legitimate commerce. Responsible Care® principles advocate for responsible product stewardship throughout the supply chain.
- Partner with Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil Society, and Companies: Collaborate across sectors to implement best practices outlined in the UN’s Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM). The American Chemical Society Responsible Care Program encourages industry collaboration and stakeholder engagement.
- Promote Awareness of Safe and Responsible Conduct in Innovation Communities: Foster a culture of responsibility within emerging fields at the convergence of chemistry and biology. The efforts of participants in competitions like the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) serve as a model for integrating responsible practices. This includes evaluating not only research safety but also the ethical, regulatory, and public acceptance implications of their work, principles that resonate strongly with the American Chemical Society Responsible Care Program’s emphasis on ethical conduct and societal responsibility.
Preventing the Weaponization of Pharmaceutical Compounds: A Growing Concern
In 2007, the British Medical Association highlighted the significant risks associated with the potential misuse of highly toxic central nervous system-acting pharmaceutical chemicals, such as fentanyls – sometimes misleadingly termed “incapacitating agents” – particularly in law enforcement contexts. More recently, Australia, along with 38 other nations party to the CWC, including the US, has underscored that these chemicals pose a serious and evolving challenge to the Convention’s objectives.
As a globally engaged organization, ACS implores governments worldwide to prioritize the following actions to effectively prevent the weaponization of such pharmaceutical compounds:
- Continue to Highlight the Dangers of Misuse: Maintain a strong focus on raising awareness about the inherent dangers of utilizing central nervous system-acting pharmaceutical chemicals outside of controlled clinical settings.
- Issue Warnings Against Weaponization for Law Enforcement: Caution against the development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling of central nervous system-acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes, emphasizing that such actions could inadvertently create a “backdoor” for the reemergence and normalization of chemical weaponization.
- Build and Implement Robust Standards Against Misuse: Establish and enforce stringent global standards to prevent the use of central nervous system-acting chemicals in law enforcement scenarios. This aligns with the ethical considerations embedded within the American Chemical Society Responsible Care Program.
The Enduring Significance of the Chemical Weapons Convention
ACS earnestly urges the United States to sustain its robust support for the CWC, working in concert with ACS members, NGOs, and other governments dedicated to preventing the resurgence of chemical weapons. It recognizes the CWC’s pivotal role in strengthening international security against chemical weapons and acknowledges the OPCW’s report indicating the destruction of over 96% of the world’s declared stockpile of CWAs.
ACS further calls upon the US to expedite the complete destruction of its remaining declared chemical weapons and to provide assistance to other States Parties, particularly those with developing chemical industries, in mitigating the potential for chemical misuse. The principles of safe chemical management and security are central to both the CWC’s goals and the American Chemical Society Responsible Care Program.
References
[1] Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, New York, NY: United Nations Security Council. March 12, 1986: 19.
[2] A/HRC/36/55, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations Human Rights Council. August 8, 2017. Accessible at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/172/341/8X/PDF/1723418.pdf?OpenElement
[3] It is understood in this statement that a chemical is defined as a non-living substance which may be produced by a synthetic chemical process (e.g. phosgene, mustard gas, chlorine), a natural living organism (e.g., ricin, conotoxin), or by a bio-mediated production process (e.g., butyric acid, bacterial toxins, or mycotoxin).
[4] Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics
[5] https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science-technology/the-hague-ethical-guidelines/
[6] The Chemical Professional’s Code of Conduct
[7] http://www.saicm.org/About/SAICMOverview/tabid/5522/language/en-US/Default.aspx
[8] Joint statement from CSP-21 (21st Conference of States Parties): https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-21/national_statements/c21nat03e.pdf
[9] Paragraph 10 of the OPCW Director General’s statement from CSP-22 (22ndConference of States Parties): https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-22/en/c22dg20e.pdf
